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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PLYING DIAMOND OIL CORPORATION,
formerly known as FLYING DIAMOND
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a limited
partnership; RALPH M. NEWTON,
EUGENE B. NEWTON and SCOTT F.
NEWTON, general partners; and
EUGENE B. NEWTON, individually,
and EDNA ELLIOTT NEWTON,
his wife,

Case No. 19178

Defendants-Respondents.
and
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO.,
a Texas corporation,
Intervenor DefendantRespondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT FLYING DIAMOND

Appellant Flying Diamond submits this brief in reply
to the response briefs of respondents Bass and Newton.

Neither

of those briefs follows the format of the appeal brief, nor the
format of the other.

For clarity, this reply is organized in

terms of the seven points initially raised, and respondents'
arguments are replied to in that context.

FACTUAL STATEMENTS
The statement of facts in Flying Diamond's brief was
neither agreed to nor specifically controverted by either
respondent, as required by the applicable rule (Utah R.
Civ. P. 75 (p) (2)); each submitted a statement that can fairly
be criticized as conclusionary and selective.
The Bass statement contains two serious factual errors
requiring correction:
(1)

Bass's purported quotation of Section 7 of the

Surface Owner's Agreement (Bass brief, p. 3)

is incorrect.

Without indication of an omission, the quotation as it there
appears omits language bearing directly upon the basic problem
of the lawsuit.

The actual language of Section 7 is copied

below, the language Bass omitted being underlined:
Subject to the provisions of Section 9 hereof, it
is agreed that the covenants to pay the sums provided
in Sections 2, 3, and 5 hereof shall be covenants
running with the surface ownership of the described
premises and shall not be held or transferred
separately therefrom, and any sums payable under this
agreement shall be paid to the person or persons
owning the surface of the described premises as of the
date the oil or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon
production is marketed. Champlin shall not, however,
become obligated to make such payments to any
subsequent purchaser of the described premises and
shall continue to make such payments to the Land Owner
until the first day of the month following the receipt
by Champlin of notice of change of ownership,
consisting of the original or certified copies of the
instrument or instruments constituting a complete
chain of title from the Land Owner to the party
claiming such ownership, and then only as to payments
thereafter made.
(R 480-81).

-2 --

(2)

Bass's brief (p. 6) states that "[n]o objection

was made to the receipt of evidence regarding the Newton's deed
nr the Ranch Purchase Contract."

In fact, all parties agreed

in the Pretrial Order that Flying Diamond had such an objection
(Pretrial Order:

IV, para. 4, R 280; VI, R 282) Flying Diamond

re-stated the objection to this extrinsic evidence at the
outset of the trial (R 526, Tr 10).

By way of expedition of

the nonjury trial, the judge received the extrinsic proof on
the following basis, understood by all parties (R 526, Tr 10):
THE COURT: All right. That gives me a little
question there. As I read I was wondering if it might
not be helpful for the purpose of -- I know you
believe it's a matter of law and you say you have some
testimony. What if we were to let them put on their
witnesses, extrinsic testimony, and then as I go
through taking your theory, if I think I need the
extrinsic testimony I will refer to it.
If not I will
ignore it.
If I take your theory -A conspicuous omission characterizes the briefs of
both respondents.

The Bass brief omits mention of Section 4 of

the Surface Owner's Agreement; the Newton brief purportedly
summarizes Section 4 (Newton brief, p. 5) but omits any
reference to the important language:

"Nothing herein contained

shall be construed • • • as a grant to Land Owner of oil or gas
rights or rights in other associated liquid hydrocarbons."
(R 480).

The provision bears directly upon the legal nature of

the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant.
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REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The 2 1/2% easement payment covenant, and
the payments, are inseparable from the
surface ownership as a matter of law.

The theory of the point stated in the caption is that
Champlin's covenant to make the 2 1/2% payments is a covenant
running with the surface ownership.

Its legal attributes are

determined by the rules of real property law and not contract
law.

The effect of such rules is that the benefits of the

covenant are inseparable from the surface ownership, so that
the separate fractional transfer of covenant benefits which
Bass and the Newtons say they attempted is precluded as a
matter of law.
Flying Diamond's Point I also demonstrated,
alternatively, that, were the covenant to be treated as
personal and not real, the legal consequences under contract
law would be identical.
Replies to the Bass and the Newton arguments about
these basic points are set out below.
I. (a)

Covenant Running With the Land.

The Surface Owner's Agreement was made against the
background of the potential for dispute inherent in the
severance of the surface estate from the oil and gas estate and
the pre-existing legal relation between the parties.

These

factors, discussed in detail in the appeal brief (pp. 11-14)
show the reasons for the inseparability provisions.

This

discussion was not challenged by either respondent.

Neither of

-4-

them directly challenged the point that real property law
governs the case.
The authorities that are cited in the appeal brief to
show that the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant is a running
covenant are not repeated here.

An additional case, Carlson v.

Lindauer, 119 Cal. App. 2d 292, 259 P.2d 925 (1953), is
directly in point and construes an agreement which is
essentially identical to the Surface Owner's Agreement.

In

Lindauer, the agreement was between Union Oil, the owner of the
oil and gas estate in described lands, and the surface owners
of the lands, who granted surface easements to Union in
consideration of Union's covenant to pay the owners 10% of the
value of the oil and gas and 40% of the net value of the
gasoline produced.

The agreement provided that "[t]he right to

receive [such] payments

.

• shall be and remain inseparable

from the ownership of such lands."

The agreement also provided

that, after testing the ground, Union could drop individual
parcels from its project and, with respect to a parcel so
excluded, Union covenanted to quitclaim the oil and gas title
to the "Owner or Owners" thereof, subject to Union's retained
surface rights of way.

Union elected to exclude the subject

lands, and then made and recorded the deed quitclaiming the oil
and gas title that was at issue in the case.

That oil and gas

title was disputed as between the successor surface owners (the
plaintiffs) and the subsequent devisees

(the defendants) of

Lucy Lindauer, the "Owner" named in the deed.

-5-

The case holds:

(1)

Union's quitclaim covenant was a covenant running

with the surface ownership, and its benefit ran to the
successor surface owner as such.

Title to the oil and gas

accordingly quieted in plaintiffs.

wa~

While the agreement

expressly stated the inseparability of the payment covenants
from the surface ownership, it did not contain a similar
express statement as to the quitclaim covenant.

Nevertheless,

the court determined that all elements of a running covenant
were present and that the quitclaim covenant could not be
separated from the surface title.

The case is a square holding

that the elements of touch and concern, privity, and intent are
present in circumstances identical to those of the present
case.
(2)

The grantee named in the quitclaim deed was "Lucy

Lindauer hereinafter referred to as 'Owner,' whether one or
more, Second Party."

This grant was held to run to the

successor surface owners, not Lucy Lindauer's heirs.

The

similarity of the term "Owner" to the term "Land Owner" as used
in the Surface Owner's Agreement is apparent.
It should be noted that the Lindauer opinion refers to
the payment covenant in the case (10%, and 40% of net)
"royalty."
an aside.

as

The covenant was not in issue, and the reference is
The court used the term in its comment that the

Union agreement carved out and granted an incorporeal
hereditament and an interest in land.

259 P.2d at 931.

this respect the Union agreement differs from the Surface
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In

Owner's Agreement, which in Section 4 expressly provides that
the Agreement does not grant oil or gas rights.

(R 480).

The brief filed by Bass does not address the basic
legal problem of covenants running with the surface ownership,
nor does it question the proposition that, if the 2 1/2%
covenant is held to run,

it follows that its benefits are

inseparable from the surface ownership.
Similarly, the Newton brief does not dispute the point
that if the covenant runs its benefits cannot be separated from
the surface ownership.

Point I of the Newton Brief asserts

that the 2 1/2% covenant does not run, and that none of the
elements of touch and concern, privity, or intent, is present.
(Newton brief, pp. 10-23).
Touch and concern.

The Newton argument (p. 12)

appears to be that the 2 1/2% payments under Section 2 "need
not be used on the land to improve it, but may be used in any
way the landowner wants."

This is contrasted with the damage

payments due under Section 5, which are apparently considered
directly related to the land.

The claimed conclusion is that

the 2 1/2% payment covenant is merely personal.
The reasoning is unclear.

All three payment covenants

are identical in nature, in that each compensates for an
adverse impact upon the surface owner's enjoyment of his
surface title; the inseparability language of the Surface
Owner's Agreement is common to them all, and accords identical
attributes to all; all of the covenants require payments to the
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person owning the surface at the time, in the same way.

The

claimed distinction is not there.
A list of cases is cited in the Newton brief

(pp.

14-20) in support of the Newton claim that the 2 1/2% covenant
does not touch and concern the surface ownership.
shows that not one supports the position taken.
cases are:

H.T. &

c.

Examination
The cited

Co. v. Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P.

950 (1916), is not a touch and concern case; it involves
privity (the privity holding, discussed below, supports the
Flying Diamond position); City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 116
Ariz. 322, 569 P.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1977), is not a touch and
concern case; it involves failure to satisfy the statute of
frauds; Choisser v. Eyman, 22 Ariz. App. 587, 529 P.2d 741
(1974), in which the court held that where the parties clearly
intend to create only a personal right enforceable by the
original covenantee, the parties negate any intent that the
covenant touch and concern the land; Choisser is cited in 5 R.
Powell, The Law of Real Property,

~

673[2], at p. 60-41 & n.27

(1981) as a court's acceptance of Dean Bigelow's proposed
touch-and-concern test (quoted in the appeal brief at p. 20);
Johnson v. State, 27 Or. App. 581, 556 P.2d 724 (1976), is not
touch and concern case; according to Powell (supra, 11 673[2],
pp. 60-44 & 60-45) , the case involves the problem whether the
burden can run when the benefit is personal, an issue not
involved where, as here, the question is as to the running of
the benefit;

California Packing Corp. v. Grove, 57 Cal. App.
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153, 196 P. 891 (1921)

is obviously distinguishable on its

facts and also involved the running of a burden; the court held
that a duty to sell peaches was personal and did not run;
Colonia Verde Homeowners Ass'n v. Kaufman, 122 Ariz. 574, 596
P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1979) is not a touch and concern case.
Some Utah cases are cited by the Newtons.

The

holdings and the reasoning of the Utah cases supply further
support for the Flying Diamond position that the 2 1/2%
covenant runs.

Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460

(1924) holds that the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment
run with the land and are enforceable by a subsequent grantee
in accordance with their terms, notwithstanding his actual
knowledge of the boundary problem warranted against.
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978) enforces a
restrictive covenant in subdivision lands.

Two cases, Latses

v. Nick Floor Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940) and
Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 P.2d 648 (1972) hold
that a covenant to pay the obligation of another (legal fees)
is personal and does not run.

The touch and concern test

stated in Lundeberg is that in order for a covenant to run the
covenant must "be of such character that its performance or
nonperformance will so affect the use, value or enjoyment of
the land itself that it must be regarded as an integral part of
the property.•
This test is clearly met by the 2 1/2% easement
payment covenant.

Champlin's remittances on account of the
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covenant (and its obligation to continue them for the duration
of the oil and gas project) affect the surface owner's use,
value and enjoyment of the surface in a fundamental way.

The

recurring payments compensate on a continuing basis for the
burdens imposed by the continuing use of the surface easement,
in appropriate amounts, at the times the burdens are imposed,
and to the owner of the surface estate so imposed upon.
Privity.

The Newton brief (pp. 20-21) makes the

assertion, not supported by any case, that the privity element
is missing.

No response is made to the demonstration in the

appeal brief (p. 21)
is present here.

that, by any of the various tests, privity

A Utah case touching the subject is H.T. & c.

Co. v. Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P. 950 (1916), in which a
wife, having no title or interest in the land,

joined as an

accomodation in a warranty deed (with running covenants) made
by her husband.

The Court held that because the wife had no

estate in the land she had no privity of estate with the
grantee's grantee, and the covenant burden did not run as
against her.

However, the Court indicated that either a

"mutual" or "successive" relationship in the property is
sufficient for privity.

(These are, respectively, the "mutual"

privity and "vertical" privity appearing in Powell's
formulation summarized in the appeal brief (p. 21)).
kinds of privity are present here.

Both

The grant of surface

easement in consideration of the surface payment ccvenants
supplies mutuality of estate in the same land.
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Successive

privity results from Flying Diamond's purchase of the surface
title, which constitutes its succession to the burdened surface
and the compensating covenant payment benefits.
Intent.

The Newtons argue (pp. 21-23)

element of a running covenant is lacking.

that the intent

In view of the

literal statement in the Surface Owner's Agreement that the
2 1/2% covenant is one
surface ownership,"

of the "covenants running with the

(R 290), and the fact that the agreement

then spells out in specific terms the legal attributes of a
running covenant, the contention is not persuasive.

There was

no such express statement in either of the two cited Utah
cases, First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 Utah
2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) and Metropolitan Investment Co. v.
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940

(1962).

In those cases, the

Court considered extrinsic facts only because of the ambiguity
of the covenants.

First Western, 27 Utah 2d at 5, 492 P.2d at

134; Sine, 14 Utah 2d at 43, 396 P.2d at 945.

In the Sine

case, extrinsic facts showed the requisite intent; the facts in
First Western showed a lack of such intent.
One argument advanced in the Newton brief (p. 22)

in

an effort to show lack of intent is based upon an incorrect
summary of the testimony of Champlin's land manager.

The

testimony there imputed to him is (in Newton's words) that
"Champlin had no interest and wouldn't care what happened so
far as an assignment between the surface owner and a third
person as to the proceeds of the Champlin payment."
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That is

not what the witness said.

His statement was that it would not

matter to Champlin if a surf ace owner made an agreement to
share the payments with another after payments were made to th.,
surface owner by Champlin (R 528, Deposition of Lagerstrom, pp
30, 55-56).

That is a wholly different idea.

The witness also

said (under Bass's cross examination) that he remembered
instances when Union Pacific "simply made it clear that they
did not recognize retention of rights separate from surface
ownership."

(R 528, Deposition of Lagerstrom, pp. 25-26).
I. (b) Contract Law Principles

The appeal brief (pp. 23-24) showed, on the basis of
rules stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §§ 317
and 320 (1981), that even if the covenant were merely personal
and contract law were applicable, no rights in the covenant or
covenant proceeds were transferred to Bass.

An assignment of

the benefit, in the severed manner here claimed, is precluded
by the Agreement.

See id.

§ 317(2) (c).

Such an assignment

would materially reduce the Agreement's value to Champlin.
id.,§ 317(2) (a).

See

Even if not so precluded, assignment could

not transfer future rights to Bass free of the condition that
the payments cease when the assignor's surface ownership ceases
(See id. § 320, Comment c.).
The Bass brief argues

(pp. 9-10, Point I.A.)

that a

share in the proceeds of the covenant is "inherently"
assignable.

It is so argued on the reasoning that the Surface

Owner's Agreement granted a "share of the production of
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minerals," which is a "royalty" and thus assignable; that a
royalty is "in the nature of common law rent," hence
,;ssignable; that being payable in money it is "assignable
because the right to money or future money is assignable."
The reasoning begins from the incorrect premise that
the covenant grants a share of the production of minerals and
is thus a royalty.

Section 4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement

expressly negatives the premise.

See R 480.

Analysis of the

problem whether the covenant benefit is or is not assignable
should begin with the applicable provisions of the instrument
creating the covenant.

These clearly spell out a specially

limited kind of assignability.

As the Surface Owner's

Agreement provides, the covenant benefit is transferrable, but
only in the manner agreed, and only to a transferee having
agreed-upon status.

Here, the purported transfer failed to

satisfy these requirements.
Bass claims (pp. 10-11, Point I.B.) that the covenant
proceeds can be separated from the surface ownership, and cites
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Shepard, 169 N.Y. 170, 62 N.E.
154 (1901) as a holding to that effect.
distinguishable.

The case is clearly

The case involved an office building in front

of which an elevated railway was constructed.

This gave rise

to a claim for the railway's damage to the easements
appurtenant to the building.

Pending adjudication, the owner

(Western Union) sold the building and its easements,
discounting the purchase price for the railway damage and

-13-

specifically reserving the right to the proceeds of the dama~e
claim.

The successor to the buyer, who took with knowledge,

was held to be bound by the reservation of the claim.

The case

holds that an accrued cause of action for trespass can be
reserved or assigned.

The case has nothing to do with the

inseparability of the benefit of a running covenant.

The

railway damages were not "in effect, a payment for an easement
over his [the buyer's]

land," as Bass claims (p. 10).

The

"easement" spoken of by the court was not the railway easement;
the court was referring to the easements appurtenant to the
building.
Point

I.e.

of the Bass brief asserts (p. 12) that

"[t]here being no words in the Surface Owner's Agreement
precluding an assignment of a share in the proceeds," such an
assignment may be made.

This argument fails for two reasons.

First, none of the Newton/Bass testimony suggests any intention
to assign a share in the proceeds, nor does their Deed.
Second, the Surface Owner's Agreement does preclude the "share
in the proceeds" theory.

Section 10 permits transfer only

subject to all the inseparability provisions,

(R 481), and

these affix all covenant benefits to the surface title and vest
the substantive right to covenant proceeds in that person who
owns the surface when a payment becomes due.

To the extent

that an assignment purports to change that agreed pattern, it
is explicitly precluded.
Bass's Point I.C. also asserts (pp. 11-12)

that the

restrictions on assignability were placed there solely for
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Champlin's benefit, and do not affect the equitable rights of
assignee and assignor as between themselves.

The Newton brief

(pp. 27-29) presents substantially the same argument.
The argument is invalid.

Both respondents rely on

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §322(2)

(1979)

for the idea

that a contract term prohibiting assignment is for the obligor's
benefit and does not prevent an assignee from acquiring rights
as against the assignor.

The text of §322(2) makes clear that

the general rule there stated applies "unless a different
intention is manifested," which is obviously the case here.

As

is stated in Comment a, which explains the rationale for
§322(2):

"In the absence of statute or other contrary public

policy, the parties to a contract have power to limit the rights
created by their agreement."
The quotation in Bass's brief (p. 13) from Martin v.
National Surety Co., 300 U.S. 588, 596-99 (1937) expresses the
same qualification:

"'After payments have been collected and

are in the hands of the' surface owner 'with notice, assignments
may be heeded, at all events in equity if they will not
frustrate the ends to which the prohibition was directed.'"
(Emphasis added).

The same qualification is apparent with

respect to the other Bass citations:

Stark v. National Research

and Design Corp., 33 N.J. Super. 315, 110 A.2d 143 (1954):
Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P.2d 405 (1942):
Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v. Welles, 242
U.S. 7 (1916).

The quotation from 3 Williston,
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Contracts §422 (Bass brief, p. 14)
basis, and for a further reason.

is distinguishable on that
The subject addressed is a

contract forbidding any assignment.

In contrast, the Surface

Owner's Agreement does not forbid assignment; assignment is
contemplated if carried out in the agreed way, and indeed is
required in specified circumstances.

Further, the ownership of

the covenant payments, when the surface is sold, is agreed to
in explicit terms.

The Bass authorities are distinguishable

for that reason.
Respondents argue (Bass brief, p. 11; Newton brief,
pp. 27-28) that the restriction upon assignability had only the
administrative purpose of affording protection for Champlin's
payments in accordance with its records.

Had that been the

purpose, the Agreement would simply have said that upon
sufficient documentation of transfer Champlin would pay the
successor owner of the covenant benefit.

Instead, the

change-of-ownership language contemplates Champlin's payments
to a successor upon proof of a chain of title to the surface
ownership.

(R 481) •

This reflects the overall substantive

purpose of assuring the inseparability of covenant benefit from
surface ownership.
Both respondents make a further argument claimed to
free them of "semantics" and to give effect to their intentions
notwithstanding the rules which preclude them under real
property law and contract law.

(See Bass brief, pp. 14-15,

Point I.D; Newton brief, pp. 27-28).

This argument, and the

reply, are discussed in Point IV(c) below.
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POINT II. Inseparability of covenant benefit and
surface ownership is shown by practical
construction.
The appeal brief detailed the instances by which all
the parties, by actions, recognized the inseparability of the
covenant benefit from the surface ownership, and instances by
which Champlin also construed the 2 1/2% covenant to be
inseparable.
The Newton brief did not address the point.
The Bass brief (p. 20) responds only with the
assertion that the conveyancing of the 2 1/2% interest showed
that the parties viewed the covenant proceeds as assignable.
That view does not appear from what the parties did.

The most

that can be claimed for the conveyancing is that Newton and
Bass attempted a transfer but recognized that transfer might
not be possible.

The quitclaiming nature of the royalty grants

recognizes inseparability, and the escape clause Bass wrote
into subparagraph I.B. of the Deed (R 485)
appeal brief at p. 26)

(discussed in the

is a most practical reinforcement of

that recognition.
The appeal brief failed to mention a further instance
of practical construction:

Champlin's land manager testified

that in other instances Union Pacific had made it clear that it
did not recognize separate retention of the payment interest
(see R 528, Deposition of Lagerstrom, pp. 25-26).
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POINT III.

Extrinsic proof is not admissible.

The appeal brief advanced the argument, based on the
general rule stated in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 6S3 (Utah
1979), that the inseparability provisions of the Surface
Owner's Agreement are without ambiguity, which makes extrinsic
proof inadmissible.

Extrinsic proof to aid in construing the

Deed and the Contract is immaterial and therefore not
admissible.
Neither respondent sought to point out any ambiguity
in the Surface Owner's Agreement.
Bass did not address the point of the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence.
The Newton brief argues (pp. 36-38), first, that
Flying Diamond "does not identify the objectionable evidence"
(p. 36).

The argument is not well taken.

Flying Diamond has

contended throughout that no extrinsic evidence was admissible.
Newton argues, secondly (p. 37), that the trial court
considered no extrinsic evidence as to the Surface Owner's
Agreement, and that it did not base its findings about the
intent of the Deed or the Ranch Purchase Contract upon the
extrinsic evidence but only upon "the conclusion clearly to be
drawn by the identical wording of the Bass/Newton Deed and the
Flying Diamond/Newton Ranch Contract."
advance the matter.

The argument does not

If the trial court ignored extrinsic

evidence about the Surface Owner's Agreement, its misreading of
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the document is a clear legal error.

As to the later

conveyances, the lower court took evidence improperly and
imputed an "intent" to the conveyances which is obviously
contrary to their wording taken alone.
Newton argues, thirdly (p. 38), that Flying Diamond by
its reliance upon extrinsic proof has waived the point.

The

record Flying Diamond made to save its overall objection is
shown at the beginning of this brief.
adopt or use respondents' evidence.

Flying Diamond did not
It could be no waiver of

the objection that, after the trial court's general ruling that
it would take respondents' evidence provisionally (R 526, Tr
10), Flying Diamond in self defense offered evidence to counter
that of the respondents.

Flying Diamond's proffer of evidence

as to the background of the Surface Owner's Agreement was a
necessary response to the ruling (in the denial of its motion
for summary judgment) that the Surface Owner's Agreement is
ambiguous, which became the law of the case for purposes of the
trial.

Such a proffer obviously does not constitute a waiver.
The authorities cited by Newton (United States v.

Silvers, 374 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Bramson, 139 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1943); and Jarabo v. United
States, 158 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1946)) have no bearing where the
evidence was necessarily offered in response to other evidence.
The Newtons also cite two Utah cases, First Western
Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132
(1971) and Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36,
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376 P.2d 940 (1962).

These required determination whether the

covenant involved was a true covenant running with the land.
Each involved the disputed factual question whether the parties
intended that the covenant be a running covenant; in each,

the

covenant was created by an ambiguous instrument 1•hich contained
no expresssion of intention.

That is not the case here.

POINT IV. The 2 1/2% covenant is not a royalty and was
not granted or otherwise transferred by the
Deed.
The appeal brief argued that the Deed's quitclaim of
"royalty" did not grant an interest in the 2 1/2% easement
payment covenant, which is not a royalty.
Bass and the Newtons dispute the point on two grounds,
principally their assertion

(made at the trial, abandoned after

the trial, now re-asserted here)

that the covenant interest is

indeed a "royalty" in the technical sense.
The argument has been belabored at length by all
parties.

It appears from the definitions of royalty quoted by

the parties (appeal brief, pp. 29-30; Bass brief, p. 9; Newton
brief, pp. 24-26)

that because the 2 1/2% ccvenant is not a

property right in the oil and gas it is not a royalty.

Section

4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement (R 480) defeats the idea.
The Newton brief (p. 16) states that the recent case of Bennion
v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, No. 18345 (Utah
November 4, 1983)
not settled.

implies that the terminology of royalty is

While the definition is not an issue in that
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case, any implication from the opinion is the opposite of what
the Newton brief claims.

The case involves the nature of the

interest of a non-consenting fractional mineral owner before
and after a forced pooling.

The Court employs the term royalty

in its standard sense, and this usage is re-inforced by its use
of the term "statutory royalty," Bennion, slip op. at 4 (the
quote marks are the Court's), to refer to the plaintiff's
interest as altered by the pooling order.

It is of note that

the Court upheld the Board's holding that "statutory royalty"
entitled the owner to take his portion of production in kind.
The more interesting argument of Bass and the Newtons
is that the decision should not turn on semantics, and that
because they intended the transfer to Bass of a continuing
one-half of all the covenant benefits the Deed should be
construed in whatever way will give effect to the intention
(Bass brief, pp. 14-15; Newton brief, pp. 27-28).

Both

respondents speak of the transaction as an assignment and both
would apply contract law principles.
These replies defeat that argument:
(a)

The 2 1/2% covenant is a true running covenant.

That being so, real property law governs (Restatement (Second)
of Contracts & Comment b, § 316(2)

(1979)) and requires

reversal of the decision below as a matter of law.

Debate

about contract principles is wholly theoretical.
(b)

As a matter of contract theory, a construction of

the Deed as an "assignment" is not what respondents now seek.
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The term is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts

s

317 (1) (1979):
An assignment of a right is a manifestation of
the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of
which the assignor's right to performance hy the
obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the
assignee acquires a right to such performance.

Respondents' present theory, if understood correctly, is not an
"assignment."

Bass does not purport to hold a direct right in

future payments, so that Champlin's payment direct to Bass
would discharge Champlin's obligation.

Respondents say that,

by the Deed, Bass acquired Newton Sheep's promise that it would
make future individual successive assignments, or sharings of
payments, after each individual payment from Champlin is in
Newton hands.

Clearly, the Deed states no such promise, nor is

there any support for the idea of such a promise in the
testimony of the Newton brothers.

Such a promise is contrary

to the testimony of Mr. Collister, who wrote the Deed (appeal
brief, p. 33).

As shown below, the supposed promise could not

have been made effectively had the parties expressed it.
(c)

If all labels be ignored and the case be taken at

its best for respondents and stated generically, the idea is
that the documents were meant to transfer to Bass the right to
share one-half of the benefits promised by Champlin in Section
2 of the Surface Owner's Agreement, that arrangement to
continue for the entire life of the Agreement.

However it may

be phrased, the idea is defeated by these inherent flaws:
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(i)

It is an agreed term of the covenant benefit,

fixed by the instrument which created it, that rights therein
are not capable of transfer to one who (like Bass) has no
surface ownership.
(ii)

It is a similarly agreed term of the covenant

benefit that a beneficiary's rights therein exist only while he
has ownership of the surface title.

Newton Sheep could not

transfer higher or more enduring rights than it had:

e.g., one

vested with a life estate cannot grant a fee simple; the holder
of a conditional promise cannot transfer rights in the promise
free of the condition.

(Negotiability is the exception to this

truism, but neither Bass or the Newtons have so far said that
the covenant is negotiable paper.)

Newton Sheep could not

transfer rights good past the duration of its own rights in the
benefit.
(iii)

The instrument of transfer does not manifest an

intention to transfer rights enduring longer than those of the
transferrer, or rights not capable of transfer.

The Deed's

stated intent is to transfer only those rights which the
transferor is entitled to transfer.

POINT V.

Respondents' assignment of proceeds theory
is contrary to the evidence.

Point V of the appeal brief (pp. 31-34) showed that
the conveyancer who prepared the Deed intended a present grant
of a real property interest in land.
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He further testified that

he used the term "royalty" with an awareness that it excluded
any idea of "the contractual right to receive monies"
brief, p. 33).

(appeal

That evidence is contrary to the assignment

theory (on which the judgment is based) and contrary to the
theory of a promise to make future assignments.

The

generalized expressions of the Newton brothers, quoted by Bass
(pp. 4-5) and the Newtons (pp. 6-7) are to the effect that the
Newtons meant a present transfer.
Neither respondent has contrived a theory which
matches the evidence with the findings, or the judgment.

The

theory of promised future assignments, an afterthought, does
not do so.

POINT VI. Estoppel by deed precludes the Bass and
Newton claims.
The appeal brief cited authorities which show that
estoppel by deed precludes Bass and the Newtons.

In the

Surface Owner's Agreement the Newton Company made the
commitment for itself and its assigns that the 2 1/2% easement
payment covenant cannot be held, or transferred, separately
from the surface ownership.

Newton and Bass would now say, to

the contrary, that they have transferred, and now hold,
fractions of the covenant benefit separately from the surface
ownership.

Estoppel by deed precludes the latter assertion.

The responses of Newton Sheep and Bass are not
sufficient to avoid the estoppel:
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(1)

Both respondents say, in effect, that Flying

Diamond must show reliance in order to invoke estoppel by deed
(Bass brief, p.

20; Newton brief, p. 34).

estoppel by deed involves reliance.

It is doubted that

This estoppel is a

mechanical rule of property based on considerations of the
security of land titles, and the elements and defenses usual in
equitable estoppel decisions do not apply.
Estoppel and Waiver, § 4 (1966).

28 Am. Jur. 2d,

The authority cited by Bass

(Bass brief, pp. 20-21), 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver,
§ 10

(from the principle stated, it appears and we assume that

Bass intended to cite § 5)

is commented on below.

cited by Newton do not support its assertion:

The cases

Ketchum Coal Co.

v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917)

is

not an estoppel by deed case, the claimed estoppel being
equitable in nature; Arizona Central Credit Union v. Holden, 6
Ariz. App. 310, 432 P.2d 276 (1967) does not involve any kind
of estoppel; the problem is bona fide purchaser status.
Contrary to what Newton claims for Rogers v. Donnellan, 11 Utah
108, 39 P. 494

(1895), that case comments (favorably to Flying

Diamond's claims of estoppel) that the maker of a deed of trust
is estopped to deny his warranties therein, and would not be
permitted to testify otherwise.
comment is a dictum.

Id. at 113, 39 P. at 496.

The

The only authority supporting respondents

is 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5 (1966), which cites
a stray Ohio case, Case v. Golnar, 33 Ohio App. 389, 169 N.E.
724 (1928).
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In any event, and whether reliance is or is not
required to invoke estoppel by deed, ample reliance is made out
here.

Flying Diamond contracted to buy, and it paid for, the

full surface title to the Ranch.

Since its purchase, it has

conducted the surface ranch operation subject to the burdens of
the oil and gas operator's uses of the surface easements, and
it has justifiably relied upon the agreed provisions in the
Surface Owner's Agreement that the surface payments compensate
the surface owner for the easement burdens.
(2)

A further Newton argument (pp. 34-35) appears to

be that the Ranch Purchase Contract "conveyed what Flying
Diamond bargained for" and that Flying Diamond seeks by
estoppel to exceed the terms of the Contract.

Colman v.

Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 (Utah 1976) and Dowse v. Kammerman, 122
Utah 85, 246 P.2d 881 (1952) are cited.

If it be the rule that

estoppel by deed does not enlarge a grant, the rule does not
operate here.

Flying Diamond seeks only what it paid for and

what was granted to it, a warranted "full" surface title.

That

title carries with it the benefit of the 2 1/2% easement
payment covenant which runs with the surface ownership.
(3)

Newton Sheep argues that the Surface Owners

Agreement "is not a deed but a contract"

(Newton brief, p. 35),

so the estoppel by deed concept is not applicable.

Newton's

own quotation of 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5
(1966)

(Newton brief, p. 35) shows that estoppel by deed can
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apply in cases of a "deed or similar instrument."

The Surface

Owner's Agreement is clearly the present grant of easements.
The grant is sufficient to raise estoppel by deed, and the
estoppel works against the Newton Company and against Newton
Sheep and Bass, its privies.

POINT VII. Flying Diamond is not estopped.
The appeal brief (pp. 36-38) showed the error of the
lower court's Finding No. 9 (R 428) and Conclusion No. 7 (R
429)

that Flying Diamond was estopped.

It was there shown that

equitable estoppel is not invoked by a quitclaim transaction,
and that the evidence was contrary to Finding No. 9.
The estoppel arguments of Bass (pp. 15-19) and the
Newtons (pp. 29-32) are essentially similar.

It is claimed

that Flying Diamond "agreed to" a one-fourth interest in the
covenant, which was granted to it by paragraph 6(a) (2) of the
Ranch Purchase Contract (R 493-94), and equitable
considerations estop Flying Diamond from claiming a greater
interest.

Bass says (p. 19) that Flying Diamond seeks to enjoy

a benefit of the Contract (ownership of the railroad lands) and
to avoid its burden (only a one-fourth interest in the proceeds
of production).

The Newtons say (p. 31) that "ordinarily a

party (or contract purchaser) cannot claim under an instrument
without affirming it."
The replies are:
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(1)

Both respondents rely upon incorrect recitals of

the testimony on this point.

Bass says (p. 16):

testimony of Scott and Ralph Newton (Tr. 64)

"The

shows that Flying

Diamond was told of the Newtons' deed to Bass and agreed to a
one-fourth share of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment." The
Newton brief says (p. 31)

"Flying Diamond drafted the [ranch

purchase] contract to accommodate Newton who insisted on
retaining their 1/4 percent."
These statements do not reflect the actual Newton
testimony, which is clear that the fractions spoken of were not
fractions of 100%, but were instead fractions of the Newton
ownership.

Scott Newton testified that the sale to Bass was

"half of our interest," and "they [Flying Diamond] would take a
quarter of what was left of the half"

(R 526, Tr 65).

Similarly, Ralph Newton testified that Flying Diamond "wouldn't
buy the property without 50 percent of our interests"
Tr 80).

(R 526,

Another discrepancy in the Bass summary is its

statement (Bass brief, pp. 5-6) that "(t]he Newtons' interest
in the 2 1/2% payment was the only mineral interest of any type
that the Newtons had in the railroad lands."

The record is

that at trial the Newton counsel noted for the record the
existence of another kind of mineral claim in the railroad
lands (R 526, Tr 11), and Bass's conveyancer testified that
other ("Radke-type") mineral interests might be involved
(R 527, Deposition of Collister, pp. 21-22; Bass brief, p. 7).
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The point of all of the foregoing is that (in contrast
with Newton Sheep's mineral titles in the fee lands, which were
much more important to the transaction)

the parties were

uncertain about the nature and extent of the Newton mineral and
"royalty" interests in the railroad sections, and that
therefore that part of their Deed affecting those sections did
not purport to make a warranted grant of one-half of 100%.

It

was instead a quitclaiming grant of one-half of what the
Newtons might be entitled to grant.
Contract followed the pattern.

The Ranch Purchase

Equitable estoppel does not

apply, because a quitclaim will not give rise to such an
estoppel.

(See appeal brief, p. 37).
Bass's brief claims (p. 19) that the royalty grant to

Flying Diamond was not a quitclaim (so as to obviate the
estoppel) and notes that the Ranch Purchase Contract calls for
"a Warranty Deed."

The substance of this is that the interest

to be conveyed under the Contract is there described as
one-half of whatever royalty Newton Sheep is entitled to
convey.

A "warranted" grant of such an interest does not call

the covenants of warranty into operation.

One lacking any

interest in the Brooklyn Bridge can safely execute a warranty
deed describing all his right, title and interest in the
Bridge; his grantee takes nothing and the granter has breached
no warranty.

Such a deed, however labelled, is not a warranty

deed.
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(2)

Bass's principal reliance is upon Russell v.

Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
938

(1957).

354 U.S.

The Russell case is distinguishable, and it

illustrates the difference between a correctly applied estoppel
and the present situation.

The property in the Russell case

was deeded by the Northern Pacific to Russell's predecessor in
1918, Northern Pacific reserving all minerals.

Russell

acquired the grantee's title, with notice of the mineral
reservation.

Texaco, Northern Pacific's oil and gas lessee,

conducted "extensive operations" on the property, beginning in
1952.

Russell thereafter sued Texaco and Northern Pacific for

a quiet title declaration that the oil and gas lease and the
mineral reservation were void, Russell's theory being that the
title acquired by Northern Pacific under the congressional
railroad land grant was such a title as not to be susceptible
to a mineral reservation by the railroad.
The decision upholds the mineral reservation and the
lease.

The opinion holds that as a "fundamental" a quiet title

plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not
the weakness of the defendant's title.

238 F.2d at 639.

Russell failed because he could "assert no independent source
of title" to the minerals.

The court said that even had

Russell's incorrect theory about Congressional intent been
sound, Russell would be estopped to assert it.
this observation about estoppel:
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The court made

Estoppel, in the nature of an equitable concept, is
designed to protect the reliances and expectations of
innocent persons from detrimental devastation by those
whose assent and recognition have induced those
reliances and expectations.
Id. at 640.

The obvious distinctions of the present case from

the Russell facts are, first,

that while Russell had no

"independent source of title," Flying Diamond has.

Flying

Diamond's ownership of the benefit of the easement payment
covenant vested by the warranted grant to it of the surface
title in which the covenant benefit inheres.

Second, on this

record (and unlike Northern Pacific and Texaco in the Russell
case), Bass and the Newtons can scarcely claim that their
"reliances and expectations [are those) of innocent persons"
which are entitled to protection from "detrimental devastation
by those who by assent and recognition have induced those
reliances and expectations."
524-25)

Exhibits 9 (R 521-22) and 20 (R

show that there was no innocence about the Bass/Newton

transaction, which was made within weeks (See R 484) after both
parties' awareness of Champlin's careful advice that the 2 1/2%
covenant ran with the surface ownership, and that after a
surface sale Newton Sheep would not receive any payments.

Nor

is there any innocence about the complicated effort to
circumvent the advice.

Further, Flying Diamond did not induce

any of the Bass/Newton reliances and expectations; it had not
entered the picture.
(3)

Bass and the Newtons cite many cases and

authorities for the proposition that, as the Newton brief puts
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it (p. 31), "Flying Diamond may not by its actions both claim
under the contract and at the same time claim it is not bound
by its terms."

The Russell case discussed above is one such

case, and a list of others is cited (Newton brief, pp. 31-32;
Bass brief, pp. 17-19).

All are distinguishable by the basic

fact that Flying Diamond seeks only to have the Ranch Purchase
Contract enforced in accordance with all of its terms.

No

claim is made by Flying Diamond that it is not bound by any
provision of the Contract.
(4)

As a further basis for the claimed estoppel of

Flying Diamond, the Newton brief asserts with apparent
seriousness that "one is not permitted in a court of justice to
take advantage of
32).

• his own wrong."

(Newton brief, p •

The "wrong" assigned to Flying Diamond is that in

preparing the Ranch Purchase Contract it followed the language
of the earlier Deed.

The brief does not further explain why

this use of the prior language was wrong but that it was not so
when first employed.

The idea of counter estoppel, suggested

by the Newton brief (p. 31), applies.

The Newtons and Bass

cannot be heard to call improper the very pattern they
themselves set.
(5)

Russell, 238 F.2d 636, holds that reliance must

be shown by one who would invoke equitable estoppel.

See also

~-

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §§ 35 & 76 (1966).

-~-

Bass

and the Newtons made their transaction long before Flying
Diamond entered the scene, and neither has done anything since
that time in reliance upon Flying Diamond.
-32-

CONCLUSION
Respondents' briefs failed to meet the points raised
in the appeal brief.

The judgment below should be vacated.
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